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Introduction  
In voting to leave the EU, British electors delivered a considerable 
political shock on 23 June 2016. Both those choosing to leave and 
those wishing to remain agree that existing constitutional principles, 
institutional structures and international relationships have been 
destabilised. It is also apparent that leaving the free trade area and 
customs union provided by EU membership will create significant 
challenges for UK manufacturers and service providers. Brexit’s 
economic challenges will occur at a time when UK public finances are 
still recovering from the 2008 financial crisis. Health and social care 
services, policing and local government services are not areas of EU 
competence, and might therefore have been expected to experience 
only lesser ripple effects from the major constitutional and trade 
shockwaves that Brexit will create. This is increasingly looking to be a 
rather optimistic supposition for the UK as a whole, and Northern 
Ireland in particular.1 
77
1 This article has been informed by the opportunity to interact with the civil servants, 
diplomatic staff, and leaders in public services and professional bodies who took part in 
a Brexit seminar series covering the UK and the Republic of Ireland. The seminars were 
made possible by an Economic and Social Research Council fund held by the University 
of Glasgow. See Impact Brexit at https://www.gla.ac.uk/research/az/brexit/presentations/
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Leaders of key public service – the National Health Service (NHS) 
and social care, police and local government – are used to dealing with 
uncertainties, but not on the scale created by Brexit. Different 
dimensions of uncertainty will be revealed as the process unfolds 
(Courtney et al., 2001, pp. 1–32). The need to be seen to act 
appropriately, decisively and authoritatively means leaders are 
reluctant to acknowledge they don’t know what is going to happen 
(Mowles, 2015, pp. 4–6). An inability to reduce or manage uncertainty 
also suggests opportunities will be missed during the disruption. 
Currently, leaders do not know how the multiple factors they are 
identifying as significant will interrelate (Smithson, 2008, pp. 13–26).  
 
Types of uncertainty 
It is useful to categorise three types of uncertainty emerging around 
Brexit:  
 
• Type I – identifiable outcomes for which data may already be 
available and analysis of impacts made.  
• Type II – multiple identifiable outcomes are possible. Gathering 
relevant data and conducting analysis of possible impacts are made 
more difficult due to a lack of previous knowledge regarding certain 
possibilities.  
• Type III – possible outcomes are not currently identifiable on the 
basis of a trusted model of how different drivers will interplay.  
 
Leaders are used to dealing with Type I, where the relevant variables 
pertaining to risk and opportunity drivers are known but not always 
quantified. Relevant data need to be collected in a timely fashion to 
aid forecasting and decision-making.  
Brexit is producing a different type of uncertainty. For example, is 
the NHS’s future going to be marked by the discontinuation of free 
movement to the UK, meaning the supply of EU27 ends or alternately 
recruitment remains open on the basis of a post-Brexit agreement? 
The eventual future may instead lie somewhere in between these 
positions – recruitment continuing but constrained by a priority 
occupation system as used for ‘rest of world’ recruitment at present. 
Identifying the range of tasks to be dealt with and estimating the 
available capacities to respond in any detail are hard in this 
circumstance of multiple possibilities, whose likelihood of occurrence 
is difficult to predict. This is Type II uncertainty.  
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Difficult as they might be, Types I and II refer to ‘known unknowns’ 
– where public service leaders can see the possibilities (Delaney, 
2008). There are also ‘unknown unknowns’ to be considered – Type III 
uncertainties, where the structure of problems are unknown and there 
is consequently no solid model to employ with respect to identifying 
and measuring key drivers (Heald et al., 2014).  
It is likely that Brexit is generating unknown unknowns, although 
this will only be confirmed in retrospect. Walking away from 
negotiations altogether implies major levels of Type III uncertainty. 
The economic consequences of new trading terms for public spending, 
abandonment of laws and regulations on which the delivery of services 
are based, exclusion from key EU institutions, an end to free 
movement and a restructuring of social citizenship rights for 
remaining migrant workers may cause events unimaginable in advance 
of occurrence, because the circumstances of multiple simultaneous 
change do not correspond to past experiences or investigation. This is 
particularly evident with respect to Northern Ireland, where, for 
example, unanticipated public opinion shifts in a country divided on 
ethno–religious lines may have consequences for the Police Service  
of Northern Ireland (PSNI), reliant as it is on securing consent. These 
are not ‘business as usual’ circumstances, causal pathways are 
unknown and the lack of ‘firm ground’ for policies makes the 
institutionalisation of uncertainty very difficult (Nowotny, 2015, pp. 
120–4). The ‘nothing is decided until everything is decided’ basis of the 
negotiations means that the usual confirmation/disconfirmation of 
possibilities, whereby uncertainties are steadily eliminated, is not 
taking place.  
 
Northern Ireland’s key public services – managing through 
uncertainty 
Without straying too far into speculative territory the sources of 
numerous potential shocks, challenges and opportunities can usefully 
be differentiated as follows:  
 
• the financial consequences of Brexit; 
• EU legal obligations and institutions;  
• EU workforce dependency in key public services; 
• the sequencing of the Brexit negotiation process and the settlement 
of the border issue with the Republic of Ireland (ROI). 
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A review of the problems and opportunities framed in terms of 
different types of uncertainty is presented below.  
 
The financial consequences of Brexit 
All tax-reliant public services face the funding supply uncertainty 
associated with post-Brexit economic conditions (CIPFA, 2017). A 
Brexit effect on levels of economic activity, employment and tax-
generated revenues is inevitable, although accurate causal attribution 
will be hard to pin down. The UK’s actual post-Brexit relationship with 
the EU will influence the amount of money redeemed out of current 
membership costs. The amounts available are subject to Type I 
uncertainty, but to gain a sense of perspective, total EU expenditure 
was €136 billion in 2016, which is less than the sum spent annually on 
the NHS across the UK (European Commission, 2018). Although the 
EU budget has grown considerably since the UK joined, it is still small 
in comparison with national government expenditures. This is highly 
significant when claims regarding membership contributions are used 
in political arguments (Dayan, 2017). The sums involved are not large 
enough to fund a public services spending spree. 
The implications of different levels of funding can be estimated on 
the basis of recent experience with fluctuating resources during 
austerity. Table 1 shows spending levels for the NHS, PSNI and local 
authorities in Northern Ireland.  
 
Table 1: Northern Ireland during austerity – spending 2011–16 (£m)    
                       2011–12       2012–13      2013–14        2014–15         2015–16  
NHS                 3,595            3,639           3,844             3,871       3,912  (+9%) 
PSNI                   957              917             899               911         820 (–14%) 
Local  
authorities         558              557             571               575         586  (+5%)  
Source: HM Treasury (2017). 
 
Health 
The data indicate that the NHS attracted 9 per cent more funding 
between 2011 and 2016. This is significantly less than the generally 
assumed 3 per cent annual increase needed to ‘stand still’ in terms of 
volume of care due to pressures associated with demographics, 
changing patterns of demand, and adoption of new drugs and 
technologies.  
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Certain Brexit outcomes may significantly reduce the number of 
EU citizens in Northern Ireland, implying lower demand for services. 
The average use of health services by immigrants appears to be lower 
than that of UK subjects. Immigrants are, on average, younger, or 
maybe some return to their country of birth for treatment, perhaps 
explaining the difference in circumstances. This constitutes Type II 
uncertainty, where a range of outcomes need to be recognised and 
estimates produced to assess potential pressures and opportunities. 
The health care of returning UK subjects in the post-Brexit era  
also needs to be factored into demand forecasts. About 1.2 million 
British migrants live in other EU countries. UK subjects currently 
living else where in the EU, mainly Spain and France, may well  
be older than average, with age-related demand patterns implying 
greater pressure on services. The net effect of Brexit is again hard to 
predict.  
 
Police 
Police services have suffered heavily from cuts to public expenditure, 
as shown in Table 1. Police service expenditure in Northern Ireland 
declined by 14 per cent between 2011 and 2016, with the number of 
officers reducing by 6 per cent (House of Commons Library, 2018). 
The cuts thus far have had less impact on crime levels than feared but 
this has been the case when public order incidents have been relatively 
infrequent. Type II uncertainties exist because the longer-term 
relationship between spending on policing and levels of crime cannot 
be taken for granted in the Northern Ireland context, where  
political violence is a threat. Certain Brexit outcomes imply more work 
for the PSNI, particularly if the maintenance of a significantly  
harder border between Northern Ireland and the ROI/EU is required. 
Type II uncertainty around cost estimates will exist until the range of 
roles expected of the PSNI are defined. The Northern Ireland  
share of the cost of developing and operating new data systems  
to replace those lost if excluded from membership of key EU 
institutions also needs to be considered. This is another Type II 
uncertainty.  
 
Local authorities 
Table 1 indicates that the Northern Irish local authority experience of 
austerity has been less severe compared with the rest of the UK. They 
have been, in real terms, at a budget standstill. Brexit may present 
challenges, particularly since Northern Ireland’s local authorities are 
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significant players in the use of EU funding, including the unique 
PEACE Programme for NI and INTERREG borders programme 
(Research and Information Service, 2011). The sums of money 
involved are not particularly large: a typical local council may receive 
around £3 million over seven years from PEACE IV. Adjusting to the 
loss of EU funding or its partial replacement generates Type I 
uncertainty. However, PEACE funding is also attractive beyond its 
immediate monetary value, enabling projects that would not otherwise 
be undertaken and giving local authorities skills in multi-sector, multi-
level partnerships (SEUPB, 2016). EU funding is a significant focus 
for the exercise of local democratic control over infrastructure and 
community development in a historical context, where the local 
authority role has been constrained after housing and education 
services were removed during the ‘Troubles’. With 80 per cent of a 
local authority’s budget typically spent on waste management, sport 
and recreation, the broadening of scope facilitated by the EU has been 
welcome (NILGA, 2014). 
The Northern Ireland Local Government Association (NILGA) 
has campaigned with its English, Welsh and Scottish partners to 
extract a commitment from the UK Government to ring-fence sums 
equivalent or greater than the money allocated from the EU in 2014 
to 2020. Encouragingly for Northern Ireland’s local authorities, the 
UK proposed, in a position paper, the continuation of funding for 
PEACE IV for the duration of the existing programme, with the 
Northern Ireland Executive and Irish Government exploring the 
potential for a future programme post 2020 (Northern Ireland Office 
and Department for Exiting the European Union, 2017). The Joint 
Report, which concluded Stage I negotiations, also indicated a wish to 
continue with a new version of PEACE (European Commission, 
2017).  
With disruption can come opportunity, and accordingly CIPFA 
(2017), the public sector accountancy body, is seeking a commitment 
from the UK Government to replace what it considers to be overly 
restrictive rules around EU funding with a system that provides 
greater local discretion over the use of resources to stimulate regional 
development. A similar opportunity exists in Northern Ireland, which 
could potentially enhance the role of local democracy. A possibility 
exists to make gains from a Type II uncertainty over a range of 
possible outcomes.  
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EU legal obligations and institutions 
Law 
The implementation of Brexit will involve substantial legislative 
enactment where EU law no longer applies to the UK. Law is a central 
definer of the environment in which public services operate and 
includes not only service-specific UK legislation but also generic laws, 
many of which have a strong EU element. Such laws cover 
employment, discrimination, competition and public procurement. 
The multinational character of the UK state, with devolution of 
powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, adds more 
complexity to the process of rejecting, replacing or adapting EU law. 
Changes to the legal basis of operating environments imply new 
compliance work for key public services. The timing of completion of 
this work is still unclear. The UK is also leaving or renegotiating ties 
with important EU institutions, some of which have significance for 
particular public services. Legal and institutional Type II uncertainties 
over the range of possible outcomes comprise a significant challenge.  
Many politicians and business and public service leaders wish to see 
specific EU-inspired laws changed. The Leave campaign focused 
heavily on the ‘anti-business’ burdens of EU legal obligation. 
Rejecting EU labour law offers a source of economic gain for both 
private and public organisations if restrictions and obligations are 
dropped. For example, local authority or social care organisations 
might reduce labour costs in the absence of existing requirements on 
gender equality, working time and the Social Charter, with its 
guidelines on conditions and rules relating to minorities. 
Relinquishing obligations to persons employed under part-time, 
agency and temporary contracts might mean lower wage bills. 
Opportunities are currently subject to calculations derived around 
estimates for a range of Type II uncertainties.  
Since EU procurement directives have already been incorporated 
into UK law, changing current rules is unlikely to be a short-term 
priority. In the future, released from EU procurement obligations, 
public services could source locally. The possibility of ‘local 
procurement’ in Northern Ireland – where, for example, a local 
authority commits to a tendering process which excludes non-local 
suppliers – represents an opportunity, but one which carries a degree 
of uncertainty for the wider economy. The ability of the Northern Irish 
state to regulate local procurement is also something of an unknown, 
with possible unforeseen consequences for the guarantee of fairness of 
opportunity.  
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In ceasing to be party to the European Working Time Directive 
(EWTD) a potential source of opportunity arises to fill near-critical 
gaps in the Northern Irish health and social care labour forces, 
through paying staff to work longer hours than currently allowed 
(House of Commons Health Committee, 2017). In the NHS this might 
be of less significance because of the existing practice of doctors 
‘opting out’, as they have been allowed to under the terms in which the 
UK recognised the EWTD. Also the new English junior doctors 
contract was framed around the EWTD, making it unlikely that the 
Northern Ireland Government will risk deviating from this position. 
Brexit releases the UK from obligations under directives that give 
EU27 citizens free at-point-of-use access to the NHS. This is an 
important element of social citizenship rights and thought to be of 
relevance to migrant workers (Greer, 2009, pp. 175–96). The impact 
that removing migrant social citizenship rights would have on 
spending in areas such as health care and education is difficult to 
predict, creating Type II uncertainty. Withdrawal of service rights for 
Irish people resident in Northern Ireland is a significant issue, since 
the border historically never presented any such denial of access. (The 
issue is discussed further in relation to the Common Travel Area 
below.)  
European Economic Area (EEA) citizens are entitled to hold a 
European Health Insurance Card (EHIC), providing access to 
medically necessary, state-provided health care during a temporary 
stay in another EEA country on the same charging basis as residents 
of the relevant country. The EEA free trade zone includes all EU 
member states plus Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein (Swiss citizens 
are also insured under the agreement). UK membership of the EEA 
after Brexit seems an increasingly unlikely possibility. The UK 
Government may try to negotiate new EHIC-type reciprocal 
agreements with the EU bloc as a whole or on a country-by-country 
basis. Administration costs associated with more intensive checking, 
authorisation of access to the services and billing of home countries 
could be significant (Nuffield Trust, 2017). For the Northern Irish 
NHS, an agreement with the ROI over access is particularly 
important. A Type I uncertainty exists where the possibility of starting 
to calculate costs is held back by lack of endpoints on which to base a 
formula.  
 
Health institutions 
The principle of subsidiarity is extremely important in the EU’s 
historical relationship with health policy. Member states still have 
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responsibility for the organisation and delivery of health services, but 
Article 152 in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty signalled the EU’s intention 
to pursue a stronger role in public health policy (Azzopardi-Muscat, 
2015; Hunter, 2003, pp. 152–3; McKee & Mackenbach, 2013). A 
period of institution-building followed, creating the health directorate 
DG SANCO in 1999. Now known as DG SANTE (Health and Food 
Safety), its remit includes public health.  
The EU also supports a number of agencies which have a role 
related to public health, most notably the European Centre for 
Disease Control and Prevention (ECDC) and the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). Their 
influence is questionable. During the ‘swine flu’ pandemic (H1N1) of 
2008 the World Health Organization and member state governments 
were recognised to be more influential than the ECDC in directing 
policy (Luteijn et al., 2011). While illicit drugs were first mentioned in 
the Amsterdam Treaty of 1993, policies are still dominated by the 
preferences of member states (Chatwin, 2013). The extent to which 
public health efforts in Northern Ireland are reliant on EU institutions 
is not clear but may become evident after Brexit. There is Type II 
uncertainty over sustaining, losing or replacing existing institutional 
ties in the public health field.  
The EU harmonised medicines regulation throughout the twenty-
eight member states, and in this respect Brexit has significance. The 
European Medicines Agency (EMA) regulates human and veterinary 
medicines developed for use in the EU and is currently based in 
London, but will move to Paris after Brexit (Timothy, 2017). At 
present a UK pharmaceutical firm submits a single application to the 
EMA to obtain a marketing authorisation that is valid in EU, EEA 
and European Free Trade Association (ETFA) countries. The UK has 
its own national regulatory agency, the Medicines and Healthcare 
Products Regulatory Agency, which can authorise drugs intended only 
for the UK. The Life Science Industry Coalition (2017) believes the 
NHS may face longer waiting times to access new drugs if the UK loses 
EMA membership.  
Another significant problem presents with losing membership of 
the EU-based European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). 
Nuclear technology is used extensively in the diagnosis and treatment 
of cancer. Significantly, radioisotopes cannot be produced in the UK 
at present and NHS access depends on the EURATOM supply agency 
(Law Society of Scotland, 2017). EMA and EURATOM membership 
is as significant for Northern Ireland as for the rest of the UK. The 
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absence of clear proposals that carry support on both sides of the 
Brexit negotiations creates Type II uncertainty. There is a danger of 
Type III uncertainty if there is a breakdown in negotiations.  
 
Policing institutions 
In operational terms Brexit presents a lengthy list of issues for UK 
policing. UK criminal justice is more closely linked to the EU than 
generally perceived. In 2014, following debates in Parliament, the UK 
opted into thirty-five EU police and criminal justice measures (House 
of Lords European Union Committee, 2016). The UK police now 
regularly utilise an extensive institutional apparatus with a basis in EU 
cooperation. The EUROPOL system gathers, analyses and shares 
information used to coordinate operations. Significantly, the UK uses 
EUROPOL more than any other member state. Police leaders see 
diminished membership status as inadequate for both the UK and the 
EU27. EUROJUST coordinates serious crime investigation and 
prosecution across EU member states. Associated translation and 
legal advice are considered significant assets, along with JITs (joint 
investigation teams). Available to all UK police officers, staff and law 
enforcement agents, SIS II (Schengen Information System) is a pan-
European database, communicating real-time information between 
participating countries. The European Arrest Warrant system, which 
the UK joined in 2015, means individuals wanted in relation to 
significant crimes can be extradited between EU member states to 
face prosecution or to serve a prison sentence for an existing 
conviction. ECRIS (European Criminal Records Information System) 
records convictions in member states, ensuring information can be 
exchanged in standardised formats to meet short legal deadlines.  
The UK Government published a position paper which expressed a 
desire to retain links with EU institutions rather than replacing police 
cooperation instruments with bilateral agreements negotiated with 
individual countries (HM Government, 2017). Type II uncertainties 
exist over the costs and effectiveness of a range of renegotiated 
systems of cooperation. There are also a range of unknown outcomes 
that new arrangements may have on policing capabilities in Northern 
Ireland, constituting Type II uncertainty.  
In addition to membership of EU-based criminal justice 
institutions, there is of course a long-standing issue over the sharing of 
policing information between the PSNI and An Garda Síochána, 
which has political as well as operational significance given the history 
of the Troubles. Progress could be compromised by a particular type 
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of Brexit settlement necessitating a hard border with the ROI. This is 
a significant concern for the PSNI, who will hope a lengthy history of 
cooperation with the Gardaí minimises exposure to Type III 
uncertainty. 
 
Local authorities 
Brexit will mean adjustment of local authorities’ existing roles in 
ensuring compliance with EU regulatory practices in areas including 
environment, building control and bathing waters. In Northern 
Ireland the local authorities are not social care providers, a sector 
employing large numbers of EU citizens in the rest of the UK. Local 
authorities are networked into the EU in various ways and any loss of 
benefits needs to be examined and addressed if possible. At present, 
local authorities face Type I uncertainty over regulations and 
institutions, which can be expected to diminish as work proceeds.  
 
Workforce dependency on EU27 
The EU’s policy of freedom of movement and mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications means that many health and social care 
professionals currently working in the UK are from other EU 
countries. This is thought to include around 60,000 of the NHS’s 1.4 
million workforce and 90,000 of the 1.6 million workers in social care 
(House of Commons Library, 2017a). The changing nature of service 
provision has resulted in staff being employed by multiple 
organisations in primary and community care where the presence of 
agency and bank staff, and independent and voluntary sector providers 
makes accurate calculations difficult (McKenna, 2017). In attempting 
to gauge the degree of exposure to a discontinuation of freedom of 
movement, the House of Commons Health Committee discovered 
that data relating to individual hospitals or care organisations were 
largely unobtainable (House of Commons Health Committee, 2017). 
NHS Digital (2018) has subsequently made available data on 
nationality, broken down by professional groupings/specialities and 
hospitals and primary care organisations. Progress has been made in 
the area of social care too, with data on the numbers of EU nationals 
working in each English local authority area classified by role now 
available (Skills for Care, 2018).  
The Northern Irish health and social care system is likely to be 
more exposed to Brexit effects than the rest of the UK as a 
consequence of having a land border with an EU27 country, whose 
citizens have a long history of joining the workforce as migrants or 
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cross-border workers. It is also the case that in Northern Ireland no 
progress has been evident in respect of collecting relevant data on 
nationality, meaning Type I uncertainty over the workforce risk 
remains. The Royal College of General Practitioners (2017) estimated 
in May 2017 that 11 per cent of general practitioners in Northern 
Ireland are EU27 citizens, which gives an indication of the possible 
scale of the problem.  
In response to a Freedom of Information request, the Southern 
Health and Social Care Trust (2017), whose area of operation runs 
along the ROI border counties of Louth and Monaghan, published 
data on staff nationalities derived from responses to Equal 
Opportunities Monitoring requests. Out of a staff count of 12,521 
some 2,493 (20 per cent) declared themselves to be Irish. This figure 
includes 191 doctors (22 per cent of total), 684 nurses (21 per cent of 
total) and 49 midwives (17 per cent of total). The data need to be 
treated very cautiously as only 45 per cent of staff responded to the 
nationality request made in 2017. It is unclear whether staff declaring 
as Irish are resident in the ROI, are resident in Northern Ireland, were 
born in the ROI or were born in Northern Ireland, or are in some 
other category related to self-identification as Irish. The reported 
numbers of EU member state staff other than those linked to the ROI 
were very small, only 60 in total, representing 0.4 per cent of the staff 
count, suggesting they tended disproportionately not to respond. In 
terms of data quality the figures provided are inadequate for 
contingency planning purposes, highlighting the need for a mandatory 
review of staffing characteristics in the NHS and social care sectors. 
The absence of an Assembly in Northern Ireland has meant there are 
fewer opportunities for elected representatives to make demands for 
information, as happened in the House of Commons regarding the 
English NHS.  
Uncertainty around workforce nationality is compounded by the 
fact that the NHS is already struggling to recruit and retain permanent 
staff. The Royal College of Nursing in Northern Ireland (2017) 
estimated there were over 2,000 nursing vacancies in the NHS and 
community care sector, representing 6.9 per cent of the funded 
workforce. The NHS in Northern Ireland is in a struggle to sustain 
services, as is the case in the rest of the UK (House of Lords, 2017). A 
reluctance by clinicians to make career choices that involve the NHS 
is likely to be exacerbated by a lengthy ‘transition period’ where the 
future status of EU27 citizens is not clear. This implies a workforce 
attrition problem for the NHS.  
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Local authorities may also experience EU27 staffing problems but 
in Northern Ireland the local authorities are not major players in 
social care, as is the case in England, and they are less dependent on 
recruiting staff with specific qualifications. The PSNI has at present a 
lengthy waiting list of applicants to join, so EU27 staff dependency is 
not a major issue for them.  
 
The border negotiations and time  
In addressing Brexit uncertainty the negotiation process is itself 
significant, since its timing sequence impacts on the viability and 
continuity of key public services (Gordon & Sutton, 2017, pp. 24–6). 
This is particularly pertinent to the issue that the border with the ROI 
may present. ‘Negotiating about negotiations’ consumed all of 2017, 
with Stage I of negotiations, beginning in March 2017, being largely 
confined to the unfunded obligations ‘divorce bill’, freedom of 
movement and the UK–Irish border. This resulted in the Joint Report 
of December 2017 (European Commission, 2017). Future 
partnerships will be addressed in Stage II negotiations, which should 
begin later in 2018. The recent European Council (2018) meeting of 
28–9 June provided little encouragement that negotiations will 
coalesce around mutually acceptable endpoints before the end of 2018 
at the earliest, if at all. This is particularly difficult for public services, 
who unlike businesses have no relocate option. While business leaders 
risked taking decisions on contingencies until the beginning of the 
2018 financial year, public services needed to be making plans much 
earlier (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2017; Institute of 
Directors, 2017).  
The parallels between the decade-long negotiations to join the 
EEC in 1972 and the current Brexit negotiations are striking (Ludlow, 
2017). The original six member states conceded little in the way of 
recognising the UK’s ‘special interests’ such as trading and social links 
with the Commonwealth countries. In spite of the obvious mutual 
economic benefits of recruiting the UK to the EEC, the six held 
together around the principle that all agreed rules had to be accepted 
with no exceptions to suit the tastes of new members.  
 
The border and health and social care services 
The 300-mile Irish border is a key issue in Brexit negotiations (House 
of Commons Exiting the European Union Committee, 2017, pp. 21–3; 
House of Lords European Union Committee, 2018, pp. 23–25). 
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Historically, no border-related employment rules have applied, and 
frictionless recruitment of staff from the ‘other side’ is a significant 
benefit for existing service providers in the ROI and Northern Ireland. 
Given services in the ROI also suffer staff shortages, guaranteeing 
rights to work in the UK will not be enough to avert resignations, 
unless practical means are found to avoid time-consuming, check-
heavy crossing procedures for staff who the EU will classify as ‘frontier 
workers’. Norway and Sweden provide examples of how technology 
reduces friction, and the border between France and Switzerland, 
which is not a EU or EEA member, has not prevented the 
employment of large numbers of frontier workers by Swiss employers, 
indicating that solutions can be found (Karlsson, 2017). However, as 
of the European Council of 28–9 June 2018, the EU has signalled no 
intention to contemplate suggested border schemes brought forward 
by the UK Government in negotiations. In these circumstances Type 
II uncertainty over multiple possible outcomes dominates.  
There is a degree of reliance by both Northern Ireland and the ROI 
on a system of sharing access to specialist services across the border 
(BMA Northern Ireland, 2018; Northern Ireland Confederation for 
Health and Social Care and NHS Confederation, 2017; Research and 
Information Service, 2016, pp. 8–9). The network for children’s heart 
disease that links diagnostic services across the island and allows 
referrals to specialist cardiology surgery in Dublin solves the problem 
of Northern Ireland’s small population numbers, which makes local 
provision unviable in terms of quality and safety. A number of hospital 
services in the NHS’s Western and Southern Health and Social Care 
Trusts are available on a cross-border basis, including renal, ENT, 
GUM and urology. Cancer treatment services located in Derry offer 
access to Irish patients resident in Donegal and Sligo. Both the 
Northern Irish and ROI health systems can adapt to new border rules 
but require some policy-enacting lead time. This is a Type I 
uncertainty – a problem where the acquisition of known data sets and 
analysis can aid decisions. The implementation of new systems will 
carry problems, but past experience of cooperation would suggest they 
would be manageable.  
 
Policing 
The police do not face the same workforce problem as the NHS. The 
likely response to a hard Brexit involving a conventional border with 
the ROI would be to use existing officers in border-related roles and 
fill their current roles with new recruits, who can be expected to be 
operational after about six months’ basic training.  
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However, when the ‘bigger picture’ is considered the PSNI faces 
potentially the biggest border-related task. A post-Brexit border with 
the ROI may require the PSNI to provide major new support to 
Border Force, UK Visas and Immigration, Immigration Enforcement, 
and HM Revenue and Customs, enforcing heavier controls and 
compliance requirements on exporters, frontier workers and visitors. 
On the other side of the border a similar task faces the Gardaí. A 
softer Brexit eliminates many problems but there will still need to be a 
‘Border Police Service’, with associated funding, staffing and training 
issues. The costs are likely to be significant. Unusually close 
cooperation will be required between the PSNI and the Gardaí in 
establishing consistent principles and practices in training officers. 
The PSNI face Type II uncertainty for the rest of the Brexit 
negotiation period unless the border issue is settled on a specific 
model. Additionally, there is the history of political violence in 
Northern Ireland and the symbolic importance of the border with the 
ROI to be reckoned with. A hard border may provide a target for 
terrorist activity, creating a source of Type III uncertainty where 
events could move in ways currently unthinkable.  
 
The Common Travel Area 
Some commentators on Brexit and Northern Ireland have assumed a 
solution is already available in the form of the Common Travel Area 
(CTA). Dayan (2018) writes in respect of the problem of securing the 
rights of ROI citizens to work in the NHS in Northern Ireland: 
 
Some security for them to stay, and for more to follow, should be 
given by the commitment to continue free circulation of people 
between the UK and the Republic through the Common Travel 
Area.  
 
The EU has previously set aside the normal regulations and codes set 
out in EU law in order to recognise the circumstances of certain 
border areas. A flexible response might therefore involve adaptation 
of the CTA to post-Brexit relationships with EU27, of which the ROI 
will be a member. The CTA has its origins in 1922, immediately prior 
to Irish independence, when the British and Irish Governments 
wanted a scheme for immigration which would avoid patrolling the 
long border between what was to become the Free State and Northern 
Ireland, while also giving Irish workers access to the UK labour 
market (House of Commons Library, 2017b). The term CTA is 
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something of a misnomer, its significance extending beyond 
immigration and travel. In effect, the Irish are not treated as 
foreigners when present in the UK on either a temporary or settled 
basis. The CTA is better understood as a reciprocal extension of 
political and social citizenship.  
The Stage I Joint Report (European Commission 2017, para. 54) 
indicates that the CTA might provide a basis for avoiding hard border 
consequences, but offers no indications as to how it can be adapted 
without ‘affecting Ireland’s obligations under Union law, in particular 
with respect to free movement for EU citizens’. While the UK will be 
free to adopt whatever approach it likes to accommodate Irish 
residents and border workers, the ROI may be prevented by the EU 
from offering British citizens reciprocal preferential treatment. It is 
also reasonable to expect other EU member states to seek assurances 
that entry into the ROI from the UK would not become a back door 
to the EU. Had the ROI not joined the EEC at the same time as the 
UK, the border and CTA issues currently evident would have 
manifested in the 1970s.  
 
Time 
While a level of certain goodwill may exist, common political and 
economic interest over the border does not extend into mainland 
Europe. A conventional border between the ROI and Northern 
Ireland may be an outcome that the bloc can live with comfortably. 
Disturbingly, the negotiation process seems to be engineered to delay 
resolution of the problem until the end, if indeed there is a conclusion 
to negotiations. Currently, there is little basis to make contingency 
plans, let alone resolve anticipated problems. With so little progress 
made on the border a difficult transition phase must be anticipated, 
carrying with it the prospect of having to deal with Type III 
uncertainty, where problems emerge unexpectedly because of a 
confluence of ill-understood forces.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
The analysis presented has employed different categories of 
uncertainty to highlight the multidimensional nature of the problems 
facing key public services. It is important to learn from the Brexit 
experience to date and suggest where remedies to continuing 
uncertainty may lie. 
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Political leadership is absent in Assembly-suspended Northern 
Ireland; however, the experiences of the Scottish and Welsh 
Governments indicate significant problems in coordinating multi-
government responses to Brexit, exposing flaws in post-devolution 
relationships that were lying dormant. The Joint Ministerial Council 
(JMC) created in 1999 is chaired by the Prime Minister and attended 
by heads of devolved governments. It also has a set of subcommittees 
involving ministers from the UK and devolved governments. The JMC 
is a ‘consultative’ body that is apparently only used when the UK 
Government sees fit (Institute for Government, 2017). Its Europe 
Negotiations Sub-Committee is unlikely to resolve public service 
uncertainties specific to Northern Ireland. While the committee 
initially met monthly after the referendum, it failed to meet at all 
between February and October 2017 and there is little to suggest it can 
be the political institution that provides for deep coordination of 
Brexit responses across the UK, to include areas of concern for key 
public services in Northern Ireland. History suggests public-service-
specific work is unlikely to feature specifically in JMC business. The 
health subcommittee met five times between 2000 and 2002 but has 
not been reconvened since. The Welsh Government favours a new 
Council of Ministers with legitimacy and powers fit for Brexit purposes 
(Welsh Government, 2017). For the foreseeable future practice, the 
JMC with its evident inadequacies will remain in place.  
Brexit is also making it apparent that relationships between 
Whitehall departments and their counterparts in the devolved 
countries have never been codified. Departments focused on the 
health, justice and local authority services in the devolved countries 
frequently take leads from their Whitehall counterparts but this is a 
part of intergovernmental relations which has no clearly identified 
constitutional basis. A reliance on professional networks appears to 
have provided sufficient coordination until Brexit. Imminent reform 
cannot be anticipated, further contributing to the atmosphere of 
uncertainty.  
If key public services are to be protected during Brexit negotiations 
by Whitehall departments then it is pertinent to ask how much specific 
attention Northern Irish issues will receive? The 2017 UK budget 
included an announcement of a £3 billion fund to be spent over the 
following two years on Brexit. The sums committed are not 
particularly large, it could be argued, given the size of the potential 
task. The Institute for Government was pessimistic concerning the 
extent of Whitehall preparation in a recent report (Owen et al., 2018).  
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The process of preparation, which involves assessing likely 
consequences on the basis of plausible premises, needs to be seen to 
move beyond Whitehall at some point and involve public service 
leaders. This is all the more significant because, in spite of the 
difficulties identified, Brexit disruptions may create unintended 
opportunities for public services in Northern Ireland. It can be argued 
that uncertainty needs to be embraced and exploited, which will 
require an endorsement of leadership in key public services. For 
example, in Northern Ireland the NHS recruitment problem may 
become critical if Irish or other EU27 staff leave the service in high 
numbers. A dependency on recruitment of overseas clinicians could be 
abandoned in favour of home-trained workforce sustainability. 
Northern Ireland also has far too many small hospitals, and a 
concentration of resources on a limited number of centres of 
excellence could emerge as a priority after Brexit. With respect to 
policing, the need to find replacement institutions of cooperation 
could provide a historic opportunity to establish greater cooperation 
with the criminal justice system in the ROI, addressing information-
sharing, data-handling, terrorism and border crime. The English Local 
Government Association sees Brexit as a historic opportunity to devise 
a simpler aid programme for poorer areas than that provided through 
EU programmes. This could benefit Northern Ireland and also 
strengthen the role of local authorities (NILGA, 2018).  
None of these opportunities can be taken unless public service 
leaders are given direction from either a UK or Northern Irish 
Government. At present this is not occurring. Instead public service 
leaders are in a situation where the options are to try and extend the 
date before they have to make key resource-committing decisions, or 
take a bet on one possible outcome and begin developing contingency 
plans. Neither are attractive options. The longer the negotiations over 
future partnerships are delayed, the greater the likelihood that post-
Brexit decisions are based on short-term expediency rather than 
strategic analysis of threats and opportunities.  
 
References 
Azzopardi-Muscat, N. (2015). European-added value for public health. The 
European Journal of Public Health, 25 (1), 1. 
BMA Northern Ireland. (2018). Brexit briefing. Retrieved from 
https://www.bma.org.uk/collective-voice/influence/europe/brexit/bma-
brexit-briefings/northern-ireland [22 June 2018]. 
94                                                                                                             GORDON MARNOCH
05 Marnoch Forum.qxp_Admin 66-3  02/08/2018  11:36  Page 94
Chatwin, C. (2013). A critical evaluation of the European drug strategy: Has 
it brought added value to drug policy making at the national level? 
International Journal of Drug Policy, 24 (3), 251–6. 
CIPFA. (2017). Weighing up the public sector costs. The Brexit balance sheet. 
London: CIPFA. 
Courtney, H., Kirkland, J., & Viguerie, P. (2001). Harvard Business Review on 
managing uncertainty. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press. 
Dayan, M. (2017). Briefing May 2017: General election 2017. Getting a Brexit 
deal that works for the NHS. London: Nuffield Trust. 
Dayan, M. (2018). How Brexit could affect the health service in Northern Ireland. 
Retrieved from https://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/news-item/how-brexit-
could-affect-the-health-service-in-northern-ireland [28 June 2018]. 
Delaney, K. (2008). Approaches to uncertain futures. In G. Bammer & M. 
Smithson (Eds), Uncertainty and risk. Multidisciplinary perspectives (pp. 
137–46). Oxford: Earthscan.  
European Commission. (2017). Joint report from the negotiators of the 
European Union and the United Kingdom Government on progress during 
phase 1 of negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom’s  
orderly withdrawal from the European Union. Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/joint-report-negotiators-
european-union-and-united-kingdom-government-progress-during-phase-
1-negotiations-under-article-50-teu-united-kingdoms-orderly-withdrawal-
european-union_en [15 January 2018]. 
European Commission. (2018). Interactive chart: EU expenditure and revenue – 
Budget 2014–2020. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/budget/ 
figures/interactive/index_en.cfm [9 January 2018]. 
European Council. (2018). European Council (Art. 50) meeting (29 June 2018) 
– Conclusions. Retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ 
35966/29-euco-art50-conclusions-en.pdf [30 June 2018]. 
Gordon, R., & Sutton, A. (2017). Negotiating Brexit: The legal landscape. 
London: The Constitution Society. 
Greer, S. (2009). Devolution and social citizenship in the UK. Bristol: Policy 
Press.  
Heald, D., Himaz, R., & Hood, C. (2014). Politics in and after fiscal squeeze. 
In C. Hood, D. Heald & R. Himaz (Eds), When the party’s over. The politics 
of fiscal squeeze. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
HM Government. (2017). Security, law enforcement and criminal justice. A 
future partnership paper. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/645416/Security__law_enfor
cement_and_criminal_justice_-_a_future_partnership_paper.PDF [15 
January 2018]. 
HM Treasury. (2017). Public expenditure statistical analyses 2017. Retrieved 
from https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/public-expenditure-statisti 
cal-analyses-2017 [15 January 2018]. 
Brexit and public services in Northern Ireland 95
05 Marnoch Forum.qxp_Admin 66-3  02/08/2018  11:36  Page 95
House of Commons Exiting the European Union Committee. (2017). The 
progress of the UK’s negotiations on EU withdrawal – Exiting the European 
Union Committee – House of Commons. Retrieved from https:// 
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmexeu/372/37202.htm 
[16 December 2017]. 
House of Commons Health Committee. (2017). Brexit and health and social 
care – People & process. London: House of Commons. 
House of Commons Library. (2017a). NHS staff from overseas: Statistics. 
Retrieved from http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/ 
Summary/CBP-7783 [15 January 2018]. 
House of Commons Library. (2017b). The Common Travel Area and the special 
status of Irish nationals in UK law. Retrieved from http://researchbriefings. 
parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7661 [15 January 2018]. 
House of Commons Library. (2018). Police service strength [Briefing paper 
number 00634]. Retrieved from http://researchbriefings.files. 
parliament.uk/documents/SN00634/SN00634.pdf [10 January 2018]. 
House of Commons Treasury Committee. (2017). 4th report transitional 
arrangements for exiting the European Union. Retrieved from 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmtreasy/473/473
02.htm [16 December 2017]. 
House of Lords. (2017). Select Committee on the Long-term Sustainability of the 
NHS. Report of session 2016–17. London: House of Lords. 
House of Lords European Union Committee. (2016). Brexit: Future UK–EU 
security and police cooperation. Retrieved from https://publications.parlia 
ment.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/77/77.pdf [22 January 2017]. 
House of Lords European Union Committee. (2018). Brexit: Devolution 
[European Union Committee 4th Report of Session 2017–19 HL Paper 9]. 
London: House of Lords. 
Hunter, D. (2003). Public health policy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Institute for Government. (2017). Devolution and the Joint Ministerial 
Committee. Retrieved from https://www.institutefor government.org. 
uk/explainers/brexit-devolution-joint-ministerial-committee [15 January 
2018]. 
Institute of Directors. (2017). The business end of Brexit. Retrieved from 
https://www.iod.com/Portals/0/PDFs/Campaigns per cent20and per 
cent20Reports/Europe per cent20and per cent20trade/The-business-end-
Brexit.pdf?ver=2017-11-14-093800-640 [15 January 2018].  
Karlsson, L. (2017). Smart border 2.0. Avoiding a hard border on the island of 
Ireland for customs control and the free movement of persons. Retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596828/IPOL
_STU(2017)596828_EN.pdf [15 January 2018]. 
Law Society of Scotland. (2017). Analysis report. The UK withdrawal from the 
EU and the potential impact on health related matters. Edinburgh: Law 
Society of Scotland. 
96                                                                                                             GORDON MARNOCH
05 Marnoch Forum.qxp_Admin 66-3  02/08/2018  11:36  Page 96
Life Science Industry Coalition. (2017). United Kingdom exit from the 
European Union Brexit [Life science industry coalition position paper]. 
Retrieved from http://www.abpi.org.uk/media/4575/uk-exiting-from-
eu_life-science-industry-coalition_position-paper.pdf [15 January 2018]. 
Ludlow, P. (2017). ‘Swallow the lot, and swallow it now’: Britain is, and was, 
deluded about its negotiating power with the EU. Retrieved from 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/11/09/swallow-the-lot-and-swallow-it-
now-britain-is-and-was-deluded-about-its-negotiating-power-with-the-eu/ 
[5 January 2018]. 
Luteijn, J., Dolk, H., & Marnoch, G. (2011). Differences in pandemic 
influenza vaccination policies for pregnant women in Europe. BMC Public 
Health, 11 (1), 819. 
McKee, M., & Mackenbach, J. (2013). Successes and failures of health policy in 
Europe: Four decades of divergent trends and converging challenges. 
Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press. 
McKenna, H. (2017). Five big issues for health and social care after the Brexit 
vote. Retrieved from https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/articles/ 
brexit-and-nhs [11 January 2017]. 
Mowles, C. (2015). Managing in uncertainty. Oxford: Routledge. 
NHS Digital. (2018). EU staff by staff group and organisation, January 2010 to 
2018 – NHS Digital. Retrieved from https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-
information/find-data-and-publications/supplementary-information/2018-
supplementary-information-files/eu-staff-by-staff-group-and-organisation-
january-2010-to-2018 [22 June 2018]. 
NILGA. (2014). NILGA–EU funding 2014–2020. Retrieved from 
http://www.nilga.org/EU-Home/EU-Funding-2014-2020.aspx [15 January 
2018]. 
NILGA. (2018). Devolution within Northern Ireland. Retrieved from 
https://www.nilga.org/media/1564/devolution-within-ni-report.pdf [22 June 
2018]. 
Northern Ireland Confederation for Health and Social Care and NHS 
Confederation. (2017). Northern Ireland and the EU exit: A unique set of 
challenges. Retrieved from http://www.nhsconfed.org/-/media/Confed 
eration/Files/Publications/Documents/NI-and-the-EU-exit—-NHSC-
briefing-295.pdf [15 January 2018]. 
Northern Ireland Office and Department for Exiting the European Union. 
(2017). Northern Ireland and Ireland – position paper. Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/northern-ireland-and-
ireland-a-position-paper [30 August 2017]. 
Nowotny, H. (2015). The cunning of uncertainty. Cambridge: Polity. 
Nuffield Trust. (2017). NHS could face bill of over half a billion pounds from 
Brexit. Retrieved from https://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/news-item/nhs-
could-face-bill-of-over-half-a-billion-pounds-from-brexit [15 January 
2018]. 
Brexit and public services in Northern Ireland 97
05 Marnoch Forum.qxp_Admin 66-3  02/08/2018  11:36  Page 97
Owen, J., Rutter, J., & Lloyd, L. (2018). Preparing Brexit: How ready is 
Whitehall? Retrieved from https://www.instituteforgovernment.org. 
uk/publications/preparing-brexit-how-ready-whitehall [15 June 2018]. 
Research and Information Service. (2011). The EU PEACE and INTERREG 
Programmes in Northern Ireland [Research and Information Service 
briefing paper]. Belfast: The Northern Ireland Assembly. 
Research and Information Service. (2016). Health and social care in NI: Areas 
of EU competence, action and support – Potential areas of impact on health 
and social care as a result of EU Referendum decision [Research and 
Information Service Briefing Paper]. Belfast: The Northern Ireland 
Assembly. 
Royal College of General Practitioners. (2017). Nearly 3.5 million patients at 
risk of losing their family doctor through Brexit, warns RCGP. Retrieved from 
http://www.rcgp.org.uk/about-us/news/2017/may/nearly-million-patients-
at-risk-of-losing-their-family-doctor-through-brexit-warns-rcgp.aspx [6 
July 2018]. 
Royal College of Nursing Northern Ireland. (2017). Northern Ireland nursing 
chief warns health service faces meltdown. Retrieved from 
https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/northern-
ireland-nursing-chief-warns-health-service-faces-meltdown-35364020.html 
[4 January 2018]. 
SEUPB. (2016). PEACE IV Programme overview. Retrieved from 
https://www.seupb.eu/piv-overview [15 January 2018]. 
Skills for Care. (2018). National minimum dataset for social care (NMDS-SC). 
Retrieved from https://data.gov.uk/dataset/9cd42409-1a44-4e6c-9696-
29d6a760e746/national-minimum-dataset-for-social-care-nmds-sc [22 June 
2018]. 
Smithson, M. (2008). The many faces and masks of uncertainty. In G. Bammer 
& M. Smithson (Eds), Uncertainty and risk. Multidisciplinary perspectives 
(pp. 13–26). Oxford: Earthscan. 
Southern Health and Social Care Trust. (2017). Freedom of Information Act 
2000 – Information request FOI 2017–244. Retrieved from 
http://www.southerntrust.hscni.net/pdf/FOI_response_2017_244.pdf [22 
June 2018]. 
Timothy, L. (2017). Preparing for Brexit: Pharmaceutical industry. Retrieved 
from https://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/news-item/preparing-for-brexit-
pharmaceutical-industry [15 January 2018]. 
Welsh Government. (2017). Brexit: Securing Wales’s future. Cardiff: Welsh 
Government. 
 
98                                                                                                             GORDON MARNOCH
05 Marnoch Forum.qxp_Admin 66-3  02/08/2018  11:36  Page 98
